The EU suggests that it is committed to 'sustainable development' including through its institutionalized relationship with the states of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This paper reviews this relationship with a view to outlining the way in which concepts like 'sustainable development' and 'poverty reduction' act as legitimation for processes of world market expansion. The paper reviews a range of interpretations of this relationship which view it either from a constructivist or materialUneven and Combined Development perspective. We critique these interpretations and provide an alternative materialist reading.
Introduction
This paper seeks to locate the EU's Sustainable Development Agenda, and it's position within the 'post-2015 Consensus' within an analysis of neo-liberalisation of EU external relations.
We argue that a specific focus on the EU's relationship with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group exemplifies a multi-scalar project of neo-liberalisation, in which the discourse of sustainability is married to mechanisms that seek to manage the process of world market expansion within state-society complexes throughout the Global South and, simultaneously, the EU. In doing so we explore the range of alternative readings of the EU-ACP relationships and the wider literature on EU external trade.
The contribution of the paper is two-fold. We seek to place the EU-ACP relationship in a wider analysis of 'sustainable development', in line with the theme of this special issue, where sustainable development is located in a wider critical analysis of its relation to neoliberalisation. Second, we offer a novel interpretation of EU-ACP trade liberalisation which acknowledges the contributions of the major interpretations of the relationship from realist, constructivist, neo-Gramscian and Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD) perspectives.
However, by contrast, our interpretation rests on the location of these contributions in a wider understanding of world market expansion, and the politics of generalised competitiveness that is associated with this. The originality of our approach is to suggest in relation to realists, neoGramscians and promoters of U&CD, that the EU-ACP trade relationship should not be read merely as the EU securing competitiveness relative to the ACP. Our contribution relative to constructivists is to acknowledge the role of ideas but to suggest that these are important only in as much as they arise from material processes and have material affects, in this case, principally world market expansion and generalised competitiveness. The significant implications of this are wide ranging and discussed briefly in the conclusion, but are of importance to those wanting to contest what they see as the damaging social, political and economic effects of trade liberalisation in both ACP and EU societies. The discussion is therefore based on an interpretation of policy documents and a critique of the relevant secondary literature.
The paper proceeds in four main parts. The first explores the EU's Sustainable Development Agenda and the centrality afforded to market-led strategies and in particular trade 
The EU's sustainability agenda
The EU has a long-standing policy commitment to 'sustainable development' running as far back as the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 1 of which committed the EU and its member states to 'promote economic and social progress…taking account of the principle of sustainable development and within the context of the accomplishment of the internal market and of reinforced cohesion and environmental protection and… ensuring that advances in economic integration are accompanied by parallel progress in other fields". It was also central to the much vaunted, if failed, Lisbon Strategy1 and the current Europe 2020 strategy for sustainable and inclusive growth,2 and more recently still to the EU's engagement with the UN's renegotiation of the Millennium Development Goals into the Sustainable Development Goals.3
A full review of these strategies is neither possible or necessary here; we offer instead just a brief identification of the six key features of the EU's engagement with sustainable development as a general objective throughout this period, and which, we argue, are broadly reflected in its relationship with the ACP. Beyond the long-standing nature of this commitment, the further five features are:
1. The commitment to securing sustainable development has long been seen as central to the EU's external relations with other states, and in particular with developing countries4.
2. The commitment to sustainable development is pursued in partnership with a range of inter-connected international organisations, including the Bretton Woods organisations, the WTO, the OECD and the UN5. The EU's institutional relations with the ACP group; partly a legacy product of formal 16 th -19 th Century imperialism, offers the EU an important strategic role in this partnership.
3. Through these external relations with ACP states and partnerships with international organisations, as well as its own internal reform processes, the EU's commitment to sustainable development is universal; being applicable to all societies at all development levels, characterised by 'shared responsibility, mutual accountability and engagement by all'. Such universality is then inherently multi-scalar, linking local communities to the national, macro-regional and global levels.
4. The approach taken to sustainable development is market based and predicated on 'Private Sector Development'. The central thrust of sustainable development is to create and secure the conditions for increased trade, investment and economic growth.6
5. Sustainable development then is about the promotion of world market expansion, both intensively (market deepening) and extensively (market broadening), and within both the EU and the wider world. The promotion of world market expansion then requires trade liberalisation externally and internally, and domestic policy reform to secure generalised conditions of competitiveness and to cope with the domestic effects of this.
As other authors point out, this way of framing of 'sustainable development' as a continuation of pre-existing economic growth strategies is contradictory7 or a wholly neo-liberal construct. 
The evolution of the CPA since 2004
The EU has maintained an institutionalised relationship with the states of the African, Pacific The prioritisation of private sector development reflects ongoing attempts to embed global market integration in path-dependent ways and increasingly sophisticated inter-scalar linkages between the EU and sub-regional, national and sub-national interests in the ACP. Through this there is a common tendency toward the creation of an attractive investment climate for capital, the provision of an infrastructure to valorise that capital and sufficient protections in the rule of law to ensure that surpluses can be realised: In the face of a lack of progress, inertia and dissent, 'Interim Agreements' were proposed and in some cases agreed. In 2011 the EU was able to leverage its position by threatening to withdraw preferential market access to the EU for any state that had not concluded and ratified an interim EPA. While trade with ACP countries represents only a small proportion of EU imports and exports, the EU is a major trading partner for ACP countries, being the main fundamentally transformed into a multi-pronged relationship with a variety of sub-regional groupings, better able to deal with variation in regional, sub-regional and national conditions.
The rationale that underpins these reforms is explicitly framed in terms of 'sustainable development', based on regional integration to foster gradual integration into the world economy and the diversification from primary production to manufacturing.
While these relationships provide for reciprocal free trade and fully liberalised access to EU markets, they also allow for a transition period for the ACP states to adjust to liberalisation via However, this assessment underplays the achievements of the process so far. The seven EPA agreements that have been negotiated provide a framework for a 35 year process of gradual liberalisation which allows for the slow social, institutional, economic, political adjustment to full integration into the world market. While some of the agreements are not yet 'comprehensive', they contain provisions for the ongoing negotiation of the depth and range of the agreements. As such, the current agreements will be subject to ongoing reform and change rather than being an end point. Furthermore, the provisions that allow for differentiation provide for the sequencing of these reforms and timescales, and agency for the ACP states within these decisions. Those ACP states that are not currently signatories are included in these ongoing negotiations, whilst having their relations with the EU secured via other institutional provisions and regional arrangements, such as the Africa-EU Partnership. Finally, while the constitution of the regional EPA associations are still under construction, the EPA process has provided a mechanism for the sub-division of the ACP into smaller, and more manageable negotiating partners.
In these ways, the EPAs establish pathways of future reform for world market expansion, taking account of the need for this to respond to scalar differentiation. While the EU's development policies, like other aspects of EU meta-governance27 frequently fail, this then provides the self-reflective logic for further policy experimentation and reform. In that sense, attempts at inter-scalar neo-liberalisation 'fail forward'.28 Within this process, the EU has demonstrated some degree of relative autonomy, through its leadership and preferences for wide scale liberalisation and the expansion of the negotiating agenda, despite the expressed opposition by certain member states. Its aims reflect a wider institutional agenda, in line with other institutions of global governance.
Interpreting the ACP-EU relationship
There From a more Gramscian underpinning, a number of authors55 argue that the CPA represents a system to encourage greater competitiveness and has a more general significance in ensuring wider compliance with multilateral liberalisation. They argue that EU material and ideational interests within the historical context of EU-ACP relations, are represented in EU efforts to 'lock-in' neo-liberalisation via EPAs, reducing their 'policy space' and undermining regional integration.
We have much sympathy with these materialist and critical constructivist accounts but we seek to differentiate our understanding somewhat. There is much to commend in Bieler/Brown/Hurt/Langan's analysis. We share the analysis of the inherent tendency of capitalist social relations toward expanded reproduction. Following Neil Smith,56 we also see this process of intensive and extensive expansion resulting in uneven patterns of development.
However, we contend that development may be both uneven and combined, but that does not does not lead to simple convergence, but is characterised by the co-evolutionary variation in the institutional, ideological and material forms that Brown identifies, or what might be described as U&CD. World market expansion must take this path dependent form for a variety of reasons, including the specificities of domestic class and other struggles; inter-capitalist competition; the ways in which these struggles are permeated with international alliances and divergences; and the particulars of production and pre-existing trade relationships. Rather than convergence, complex processes of inter-scalar policy borrowing and experimentation66 occur through social struggles which sometimes seek to shape processes with tendentially universal characteristics -such as trade liberalisation, democratisation, environmental regulation -to best suit localised conditions. National and sub-national elites seek to promote their own interests, sometimes with, and sometimes against transnational capital. As Bieler67 shows, this may produce elite coalitions with capital and organised labour, but at other times there will be more scope for transnational solidarism from below.
Trade liberalisation has been fully subject to these complex and dynamic struggles, unfolding within the context of a world market expansion that has altered the geo-politics of multi-lateral cooperation. As this has led to stalling multi-lateral trade liberalisation, elites and those with much to gain from further liberalisation, have sought other means, and regional and subregional arrangements have proliferated as a result. In that sense, and others, policy reform for neo-liberalisation is not universally successful and frequently results in failure. Far from halting the momentum behind neo-liberalisation though, failure is often used as a justification for further reform. In times of growth, it makes sense to use neo-liberalisation to 'fix the roof while the sun shines'; in times of economic crisis neo-liberalisation is justified on the grounds that reform is then more urgently needed. When policy reform fails, it typically 'fails forward '68 with failure being the logic for renewed efforts to overcome barriers and opposition and to engage in more policy experimentation.
The ongoing changes to the EU-ACP relationship represents an inter-scalar reform process which is likely to exhibit different path-dependent social struggles at the sub-regional, state and sub-state scales, within pressures for trade liberalisation and market oriented reform. Ideas are significant here but only inasmuch as they emerge from material processes of social struggle and have material consequences, primarily in this case in relation to world market expansion. As Marx and Engels69 famously argued in the 1840s, to assume that ideas have some life outside of material social struggles is a somewhat bizarre conclusion -and as we read it this is not what 'constructivists' argue; rather constructivism appears as the assertion that within processes of policy reform, ideas and the institutions that are shaped by them, matter. That much we concede. However, rhetorical principles and concepts such as sustainable development must be located within an understanding of world market expansion and the contradictory processes that this realises.
Conclusion
The evolution of the EPA trade regime between the EU and ACP remains characteristic of an attempt to ensure neo-liberalisation in the name of pro-poor and sustainable development. This is a multi-scalar process that is further entrenched via the regionalisaion of the trade agenda on which the Cotonou reforms rest. The form of dependent development promoted by the 'partnership' is pro-market in orientation and attempts to secure and deepen the embedding of the world market in different national ACP contexts. This is not a simple process of homogenisation and policy convergence but embedding the world market in the domestic political economy -a process that even when subject to universal processes, most notably competitiveness, is always nationally specific and path dependent by necessity. Variegation in the extent to which trade is liberalised between countries, between sectors and the way in which liberalisation or even protectionism is justified and achieved are to be expected. As it has evolved the EU-ACP relationship has embraced and recognised this variegation.
The variegated reform that results from the EU-ACP relationship is much more expansive than and policy reform sometimes -often even -fail or stall is merely the invitation for further evolution. In the end, the EU's attempt at sustainable development is to sustain both world market expansion and the processes of variegated reform that it entails by establishing the multi-scalar governance mechanisms, that this can operate through. These include establishing alliances with major international organisations around key framing concepts such as sustainable development and poverty reduction, the long-term institutionalised EU-ACP relationship as in the CPA, sub-regional cooperation in the EPAs and 'deep' domestic reform processes too.
